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Abstract
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among delinquents are mod-
eled by means of a graph where delinquents compete for a booty and beneﬁt from local interactions
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which targets the delinquent who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduc-
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Polls show that people regard crime and delinquency as the number one social problem. As such,
identifying the root causes of delinquent activity and designing eﬃcient policies against delinquency
are two natural scopes for the economics profession. About thirty years ago, the major breakthrough
in the economic analysis of crime was the work of Becker (1968) in which delinquents are rational
individuals acting in their own self-interest. In deciding to commit a delinquency, delinquents weigh
the expected costs against the expected beneﬁts accruing from this activity. The goal of the criminal
justice system is to raise expected costs of delinquency to oﬀenders above the expected beneﬁts.
People will commit crimes only so long as they are willing to pay the prices society charges.
There is by now a large literature on the economics of crime. Both theoretical and empirical
approaches have been developed over the years in order to better understand the costs and beneﬁts
of crime (see, for instance, the literature surveys by Garoupa, 1997, and Polinsky and Shavell,
2000). In particular, the interaction between the “delinquency market” and the other markets has
important general equilibrium eﬀects that are crucial if one wants to implement the most eﬀective
policies.1 The standard policy tool to reduce aggregate delinquency that is common to all these
models relies on the deterrence eﬀects of punishment, i.e., the planner should increase uniformly
punishment costs.
It is however well-established that delinquency is, to some extent, a group phenomenon, and
the source of crime and delinquency is located in the intimate social networks of individuals (see
e.g. Sutherland, 1947, Sarnecki, 2001 and Warr, 2002). Indeed, delinquents often have friends
who have themselves committed several oﬀences, and social ties among delinquents are seen as a
means whereby individuals exert an inﬂuence over one another to commit crimes. In fact, not only
friends but also the structure of social networks matters in explaining individual’s own delinquent
behavior. In adolescents’ friendship networks, Haynie (2001) and Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005,
2009) show that individual Bonacich centrality (a standard measure of network centrality) together
with the density of friendship links condition the delinquency-peer association. This suggests that
the underlying structural properties of friendship networks must be taken into account to better
understand the impact of peer inﬂuence on delinquent behavior and to address adequate and novel
delinquency-reducing policies.
In this paper, we develop an explicit delinquent network game where individuals decide non-
cooperatively their crime eﬀort by using the network model developed by Ballester et al. (2006) to
the case of delinquent networks. For this purpose, we build on the Beckerian incentives approach
1For example, Burdett et al. (2003) and Huang et al. (2004) study the interaction between crime and unemploy-
ment, while Verdier and Zenou (2004) analyze the impact of the land market on criminal activities. Others have
focused on the education market (Lochner, 2004) or on political economy aspects of crime (˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al., 2000).
Most of these models generate multiple equilibria that can explain why identical areas may end up with diﬀerent
amounts of crime.
2to delinquency behavior but let the cost to commit delinquent oﬀenses to be determined, in part,
by one’s network of delinquent mates. We then consider diﬀerent policies that aim at reducing the
total crime activity in a delinquent network. Compared to Ballester et al. (2006), the present paper
has the following innovations: (i) the payoﬀ function contains a component with global strategic
substitutes and is parameterized so that the eﬀects of diﬀerent parameters can be easily interpreted;
(ii) it compares the eﬀects of an increase in “punishment” and other standard crime policies with
a “key player” policy; (iii) it analyzes a “key group” and a “key link” policy, in addition to the
“key player” policy; (iv) it shows that ﬁnding a “key group” is an NP-hard problem and provide a
simple (greedy) algorithm and a bound for the degree of suboptimality of the algorithm’s solution;
(v) it characterizes the equilibrium of a so-called “entry game” where individuals decide whether to
continue participating in a delinquent network (in their previously allotted position) or take some
j o bi nt h eo u t s i d ew o r l d ;(vi) it analyzes the “key player” and “key group” policies in the “entry
game.” To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper analyzing policies aiming at reducing
crime in an explicit social network framework.2
Let us now be more precise about what we do in this paper. Following Ballester et al. (2006),
we develop a delinquent network model where the payoﬀ interdependence is, at least in part,
rooted in the network links across players (see, in particular, the recent literature surveys by Goyal,
2007 and Jackson, 2008). At the Nash equilibrium, we obtain a relationship between equilibrium
strategic behavior and network topology, as captured by the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure.
This measure is an index of connectivity that not only takes into account the number of direct links
a given delinquent has but also all his indirect connections.3 In our delinquency game, the network
payoﬀ interdependence is restricted to direct network mates. But, because clusters of direct friends
overlap, this local payoﬀ interdependence spreads all over the network. At equilibrium, individual
decisions emanate from all the existing network chains of direct and indirect contacts stemming
from each player, a feature characteristic of Katz-Bonacich centrality.
Because network chains of contacts often overlap, the values of individual centrality indices are
interrelated, which further translates into the interdependence of individual delinquency outcomes,
and between individual and group (average) outcomes. This dependence of individual on group
behavior is usually referred to as peer eﬀects in the literature.4 Peer eﬀects are an intragroup
externality, homogeneous across group members, that captures the average inﬂuence that members
exert on each other. In our model, though, the peer eﬀect inﬂuence varies across delinquents with
their equilibrium-Bonacich centrality measure. The intragroup externality we obtain is heteroge-
2Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) proposed a network model of criminal activities but without looking at policy
issues.
3There are, of course, other measures of centrality (for example the class of betweenness measures; see Wasserman
and Faust, 1994).
4The empirical evidence collected so far in the economics literature suggests that peer eﬀects are, indeed, quite
strong in criminal decisions. See, for instance, Case and Katz (1991), Glaeser et al. (1996), Ludwig et al. (2001),
Patacchini and Zenou (2006), Sirakaya (2006), Damm and Dustmann (2008), Bayer et al. (2009).
3neous across delinquents, and this heterogeneity reﬂects asymmetries in network locations across
group members.
The standard policy tool to reduce aggregate delinquency relies on the deterrence eﬀects of pun-
ishment. By uniformly hardening the punishment costs borne by all delinquents, the distribution
of delinquency eﬀorts shifts to the left and the average (and aggregate) delinquency level decreases.
This homogeneous policy tackles average behavior explicitly and does not discriminate among delin-
quents depending on their relative contribution to the aggregate delinquency level. Our previous
results, though, associate a distribution of delinquency eﬀorts to the network connecting them. In
particular, the variance of delinquency eﬀorts reﬂects the variance of network centralities. In this
case, a targeted policy that discriminates among delinquents depending on their relative network
location, and removes a few suitably selected targets from this network, alters the whole distribu-
tion of delinquency eﬀorts, not just shifting it. In many cases, it may yield to a sharper reduction
in aggregate delinquency than standard deterrence eﬀorts. In practice, the planner may want to
identify optimal network targets to concentrate (scarce) investigatory resources on some particular
individuals, or to isolate them from the rest of the group, either through leniency programs, social
assistance programs, or incarceration.
To characterize the network optimal targets, we use a new measure of network centrality, the
intercentrality measure,p r o p o s e db yB a l l e s t e ret al. (2006). This measure solves the planner’s
problem that consists in ﬁnding and getting rid of the key player, i.e., the delinquent who, once
removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. We show that the key player is,
precisely, the individual with the highest intercentrality in the network.
At this point, it is important to note that, to implement the key-player policy, one does not
need to have all the information about the exact structure of the network. Indeed, the planner does
not need to know all the links each individual has but only needs to be able to rank delinquents
according to their intercentrality measure.5 This is less demanding in terms of information and it
implies, in particular, that two diﬀerent networks can lead to the same policy implication, i.e., the
same key player to remove. Take for example a star-shaped network. Then it does not matter how
many links has the central delinquent, or whether some peripheral delinquents have some direct link
with each other, or even how large the network is. In all these cases, the planner will remove the
central delinquent because this is the key player −the delinquent with the highest intercentrality
measure. This is obviously an extreme case and in other networks one may need more information
to identify the key player. But this simple example highlights the advantages of implementing a
5Note that an undirected unweighted network is fully characterized by n(n−1)/2 values −the list of actual network
links. We show that two n− dimensional vectors aggregate this information in an enough informative manner for
our purposes: ﬁrst, to identify crime behavior − equilibrium-Bonacich centrality− and second, to identify optimal
policy targets −optimal inter-centality. We further show that the only valuable information to identify the optimal
target provided by the vector of optimal-inter-centralities is of ordinal nature, which further reduces the informational
requirements on the network structure to eﬀectively implement this policy.
4key-player policy.
We extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal for delinquency reduc-
tion, the key player, to optimal group removal, the key group. For this purpose, we generalize the
intercentrality measure to groups of players. For a given group size, the key group is precisely the
one with the highest value for such centrality measure among groups of exactly this size. Given
that the individual intercentrality captures both direct and indirect eﬀects on equilibrium Katz-
Bonacich centrality measures, the generalization to a group of the intercentrality measure needs to
account (once and only once) for all the cross-contributions that arise both within and outside the
group. For this reason, and contrary to most centrality measures found in the literature, the group
centrality index is not a straightforward aggregation of its members centrality indices.
We then consider an alternative policy which aims at optimally removing a link (or a set of
links) between two individuals in order to minimize the total delinquency level. In some situations,
the limitation of resources or the nature of the problem requires to choose optimally among the set
of dependences among players. For instance, a social planner would like to optimally reduce the
(communication) externalities among delinquents, subject to a restriction in the number of bilateral
inﬂuences that can be targeted. This situation is interpreted as a problem of optimally removing a
set of links from the network. We obtain a new centrality measure which is roughly proportional
to the product of the Katz-Bonacich centrality indices of the two delinquents involved in the link.
Because the geometric intricacies of the delinquency network are explicitly taken into account
in the characterization of optimal network targets, the implications of our policy prescriptions are
quite diﬀerent from the standard deterrence-based policies, where both the apprehension probabil-
ity and punishment are increased uniformly. We show that the key player (group) policy displays
amplifying eﬀects, and the gains following the judicious choice of the key player (group) go beyond
the diﬀerences in intercentrality measures between the selected targets and any other delinquents
in the network. We also show that the relative gains from targeting the key player (group) instead
of operating a selection at random of a delinquent in the delinquency network increase with the
variability in intercentrality measures across delinquents. In other words, the key player (group)
prescription is particularly well-suited for networks that display stark location asymmetries across
nodes. Also, our policy prescriptions rely on centrality measures particularly robust to mispeciﬁca-
tions in network data, and thus open the door to relatively accurate estimations of these measures
with small samples of network data.
In the last part of the paper, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing
players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent oﬀenses. The model is now richer
since, apart from punishment, the outside wage is an additional delinquency-reducing policy tool
available to the planner. We show that the key player policy prescription now depends both on
network features and on the wage level.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we expose the basic delinquency
5network game, characterize the Nash equilibrium, prove its existence and uniqueness, and give the
general comparative statics results. In section 3, we analyze the key-player, group-player and key-
link policies. Section 4 is devoted to the endogenous participation of individuals to delinquent
activities. We analyze, in particular, how the policies exposed in Section 3 are aﬀected by this
choice. Throughout the paper, we use the same example of a particular bridge network with 11
delinquents to illustrate all our results.
2 Delinquency network outcomes
2.1 The delinquency network game
The network6 A network g is a set of ex-ante identical individuals N = {1,...,n} and a
set of links between them. We assume n ≥ 2.T h en−square adjacency matrix G of a network g
keeps track of the direct connections in this network. By deﬁnition, players i and j are directly
connected in g if and only if gij =1 , (denoted by link ij), and gij =0otherwise.7 Links need
n o tb er e c i p r o c a l ,s ot h a tw em a yh a v eg12 =1and g21 =0 .O n l yi ns o m eo fo u rr e s u l t sw ew i l l
explicitly impose this symmetry. By convention, gii =0 .T h u s G is (0,1)−matrix with zeros on
its diagonal.
The delinquency decision game We focus on petty crimes so we consider delinquents
rather than criminals.8 Consider some delinquency network g. Delinquents in the network decide
how much eﬀo r tt oe x e r t . W ed e n o t eb yxi the delinquency eﬀort level of delinquent i,a n db y
x =( x1,...,x n) the population delinquency proﬁle.
Following Becker (1968), we assume that delinquents trade oﬀ the costs and beneﬁts of delin-
quent activities to take their delinquency eﬀort decision. The expected delinquency gains to delin-










The individual proceeds yi(x) correspond to the gross delinquency payoﬀso fd e l i n q u e n ti.I n -
dividual i gross payoﬀ positively depends on i’s delinquency involvement xi,a n do nt h ew h o l e
population delinquency eﬀort x. The proceeds yi(x) indicate the global9 payoﬀ interdependence.
The cost of committing delinquency pi(x,g)f is also positively related to xi as the apprehension
probability increases with one’s involvement in delinquency, hitherto, with one’s exposure to deter-
6General deﬁnitions and notations of matrices and networks can be found in Appendix A.
7Our model can be extended to allow for weighted links in a straightforward way.
8It is well-documented that social interactions and peer eﬀects are stronger for petty crimes than for other types
of crimes (Glaeser et al., 1996; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008).
9That is, across all criminals in the network.
6rence. In words, pi(x,g) reﬂects local complementarities in delinquency eﬀorts across delinquents
directly connected through g.10
The crucial assumption made here is that delinquents improve illegal practice while interacting
with their direct delinquent mates. In other words, we assume that the higher the criminal connec-
tions to a criminal and/or the higher the involvement in criminal activities of these connections,
the lower his individual probability to be caught pi(x,g). The idea is as follows. There is no formal
way of learning to become a criminal, no proper “school” providing an organized transmission of
the objective skills needed to undertake successful criminal activities. Given this lack of formal
institutional arrangement, we believe that the most natural and eﬃcient way to learn to become
a criminal is through the interaction with other criminals. Delinquents learn from other criminals
belonging to the same network how to commit crime in a more eﬃcient way by sharing the know-
how about the “technology” of crime. In our model, we capture this local nature of the mechanism
through which skills are acquired by relating the individual probability to be caught to the crime
level involvement of one’s direct mates, and by assuming that this probability decreases with the
corresponding local aggregate level of crime.
This view of criminal networks and the role of peers in learning the technology of crime is not
new, at least in the criminology literature. In his very inﬂuential theory of diﬀerential association,
Sutherland (1947) locates the source of crime and delinquency in the intimate social networks of
individuals. Emphasizing that criminal behavior is learned behavior, Sutherland (1947) argued that
persons who are selectively or diﬀerentially exposed to delinquent associates are likely to acquire
that trait as well.11 In particular, one of his main propositions states that when criminal behavior
is learned, the learning includes (i) techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very
complicated, sometimes very simple, (ii) the speciﬁc direction of motives, drives, rationalization
and attitudes. Interestingly, the positive correlation between self-reported delinquency and the
number of delinquent friends reported by adolescents has proven to be among the strongest and
one of the most consistently reported ﬁndings in the delinquency literature (for surveys, see War,
1996 and Matsueda and Anderson, 1998).
One natural way of interpreting the social connections between criminals is through a gang
since the latter is in general viewed as a speciﬁc type of criminal network (Sarnecki, 2001). Indeed,
when individuals belong to the same gang, they learn from each other. Using data from the
Rochester Youth Development study, which followed 1,000 adolescents through their early adult
years, Thornberry et al. (1993) ﬁnd that once individuals become members of a gang, their rates
10See also Brock and Durlauf (2001) for a global/local dichotomy in capturing social interactions and Ioannides
(2006) for an exhaustive analysis of the eﬀects of network topology in the Brock and Durlauf setting. Observe that all
our results remain unchanged if the local network externalities enter the beneﬁt function instead of the cost function
i n( 2 )a sl o n ga sn e t w o r kp a y o ﬀsr e ﬂect net strategic substituability.
11Sutherland (1947) and Akers (1998) expressly argue that criminal behavior is learned from others in the same
way that all human behavior is learned. Indeed, young people may be inﬂuenced by their peers in all categories of
behavior - music, speech, dress, sports, and delinquency.
7of delinquency increase substantially compared to their behavior before entering the gang. In other
words, networks of criminals or gangs amplify delinquent behaviors. In the sociological literature,
this is referred to as the social facilitation model, where gang members are intrinsically no diﬀerent
from nongang members in terms of delinquency or drug use. If they do join a gang, however, the
normative structure and group processes of the gang (network) are likely to bring about high rates
of delinquency and drug use. Gang membership is thus viewed as a major cause of deviant behavior.
This is also what is found by Thornberry et al. (2003). In the present paper, the gang interpretation
of the network is possible as long as it means that the role of gangs is to facilitate the learning
of crime technology to its members without implying that crimes are committed collectively as it
is sometimes the case in gang activities. In other words, in our model, individuals learn illegal
conduct from others but practice it alone.
Since in most of the papers cited above (from the sociology and criminology literatures), selection
and endogeneity issues are not properly addressed, we would like to provide some evidence on
learning in crime from the economics literature where these econometric issues are taken into
account. Damm and Dustmann (2008) investigate the following question: Does growing up in a
neighborhood in which a relatively high share of youth has committed crime increase the individual’s
probability of committing crime later on? To answer this question, Damm and Dustmann exploit
a Danish natural experiment that randomly allocates parents of young children to neighborhoods
with diﬀerent shares of youth criminals. With area ﬁxed eﬀects, their key results are that one
standard deviation increase in the share of youth criminals in the municipality of initial assignment
increases the probability of being charge with an oﬀense at the age 18-21 by 8 percentages point (or
23 percent) for men. This neighborhood crime eﬀect is mainly driven by property crime.12 Bayer
et al. (2009) consider the inﬂuence that juvenile oﬀenders serving time in the same correctional
facility have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior. They also ﬁnd strong evidence of learning
eﬀects in criminal activities since exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular crime
increases the probability that an individual who has already committed the same type of crime
recidivates with that crime.13
There are clearly learning eﬀects in crime. One may, however, argue that, although delinquents
learn a lot from their best friends, the learning is not inﬁnite so that after some time friends do not
provide any positive externalities that may reduce the probability to be caught. This is clearly not
true at least for delinquent friendships. Indeed, the techniques and information about crime are
not static and constantly evolving. For example, friends may help a delinquent to be more eﬃcient
12Without controlling for selection eﬀects, Case and Katz (1991), using data from the 1989 NBER survey of youths
living in low-income Boston neighborhoods, ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of moving a youth with given family and
personal characteristics to a neighborhood where 10 percent more of the youths are involved in crime than in his or
her initial neighborhood is to raise the probabibility the youth will become involved in crime by 2.3 percent.
13Building on the binary choice model of Brock and Durlauf (2001), Sirakaya (2006) identiﬁes social interactions
as the primary source of recidivist behavior in the United States.
8in shoplifting by explaining the new type of protection that has been installed in a particular shop.
This information may not be valid a year later if the shop has changed its protection system. Friends
can also tell a delinquent which apartment has already been robbed so that it avoid this delinquent
to take risk without getting much proceeds. Another interesting example is people selling illegal
DVDs on the street. They share knowledge based on experience (level of activity) but they decide
on their eﬀort separately. To summarize, delinquents who know each other can share information
because they are friends (we take this communication as given) even though they act separately in
the delinquent world.



























so that, by direct substitution, we can focus on the following utility function:








where π = p0f is the the marginal expected punishment cost for an isolated delinquent. We assume






σ = −δ + πφgij if gij =1
σ = −δ if gij =0
(4)
so that σij ∈ {σ,σ}, for all i 6= j with σ ≤ 0. The parameter δ ≥ 0 measures the intensity of the
global interdependence on gross delinquency payoﬀs. Here, individual delinquency eﬀorts are global
strategic substitutes. The optimal delinquency eﬀort of a given delinquent thus decreases with the
delinquency involvement of any other delinquent in the network. The expression πφ > 0 captures
the local strategic complementarity of eﬀorts on the apprehension probability.15 This expression
is non-zero only when gij =1 , that is, when delinquents i and j are directly linked to each other.
Finally, note that ∂2ui(x,g)/∂x2
i = −2δ<0.
14This assumption is satisﬁed, for instance, when δ ≥ φ or π ≥ 1/2.
15Ad i ﬀerent scenario arises if we assume that players face substitutability in actions at the local level (φ<0),
which results in a game with substitutabilities. Bramoullé et al. (2008) provide an exhaustive theoretical analysis of
this case.
92.2 The Katz-Bonacich network centrality measure
Let Gk be the kth power of G,w i t hc o e ﬃcients g
[k]
ij ,w h e r ek is some integer. The matrix Gk keeps
track of the indirect connections in the network: g
[k]
ij ≥ 0 measures the number of walks16 of length
k ≥ 1 in g from i to j. In particular, G0 = I.






These expressions are all well-deﬁned for low enough values of a.17 The parameter a is a decay
factor that scales down the relative weight of longer walks.




ij count the number
of walks in g starting from i and ending at j,w h e r ew a l k so fl e n g t hk are weighted by ak.
Let 1 be the n−dimensional vector of ones.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider a network g with adjacency n−square matrix G a n das c a l a ra such that
M(g,a)=[ I−aG]
−1 is well-deﬁned and non-negative. The vector of Katz-Bonacich centralities of
parameter a in g is:
b(g,a)=[ I−aG]
−1 · 1 (5)
The Katz-Bonacich centrality18 of node i is bi(g,a)=
Pn
j=1 mij(g,a), and counts the total
number of walks in g starting from i.B y d e ﬁnition, mii(g,a) ≥ 1, and thus bi(g,a) ≥ 1,w i t h
equality when a =0 .
2.3 Nash equilibrium
For all y ∈IR n, y = y1 +...+yn is the sum of its coordinates. Deﬁne b(g,θ)=
Pi=n
i=1 bi(g,θ),d e n o t e
θ = πφ/δ and let ρ(g) be the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix G (see Appendix A). We have
the following result:19




δ [1 + b(g,θ)]
b(g,θ) (6)
The equilibrium Katz-Bonacich centrality measure b(g,θ) is thus the relevant network char-
acteristic that shapes equilibrium behavior. The condition θρ(g) < 1 relates the payoﬀ function
16See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of a walk.
17Take a smaller than the spectral radius of G,d e ﬁn e di nA p p e n d i xA .
18due to Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987).
19All proofs are given in Appendix B.
10to the network topology. When this condition holds,20 the ratio of the local to the global payoﬀ
interdependence θ = πφ/δ is lower than the inverse of the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix
G of the network g, which is a measure of connectivity in the network g.L e tl(g) ≡ 1>G1,t h a t ,
is, the number of links in the network g. As a matter of fact, ρ(g) ≤
p
l(g)+n − 1,s ot h a t
θ
p
l(g)+n − 1 < 1 is a stronger suﬃcient condition that dispenses from computing the spectral
radius of G. In this case (and only then), the matrix [I−θG]
−1 can be developed into the inﬁnite
sum
P
k≥0 θkGk, which brings the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure into the picture.
The game we analyze here belongs to games with complementarities, for which the cross-payoﬀs
derivatives between every pair of players are non-negative. The condition θρ(g) < 1 guarantees
that local complementarities are not too large compared to own concavity. When this condition
does not hold, existence of equilibrium becomes an issue because the strategy space is unbounded.
The literature on supermodular games (see Topkis, 1979, Amir, 2005, Vives, 2005, for literature
surveys) has dealt with this problem by imposing a bounded lattice on the strategy space.
Consistent with the predictions of our model, two recent empirical studies by Haynie (2001)
and Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005) show that structural properties of friendship networks indeed
condition the association between friends’ delinquency and an individual’s own delinquent behav-
ior.21 Also, by analyzing the network organization of conspiracy, Baker and Faulkner (1993) show
that a measure of network centrality based on direct links predicts the individual probability to be
apprehended and convicted as well as the magnitude of the ﬁne.
2.4 Comparative statics
In Proposition 1, the individual and aggregate delinquency levels depend on the underlying net-
work g connecting them through the adjacency matrix G in (6). The next result establishes a
positive relationship between the equilibrium aggregate delinquency level and the network pattern
of connections.
We write g ⊂ g0 to denote that the set of links in g0 contains the links in g, i.e.,for all i,j, g0
ij =1
if gij =1 .
Proposition 2 Let g and g0 be symmetric networks such that g ⊂ g0.I f θρ(g0) < 1,t h e n ,i n
equilibrium, the total delinquency level under g0 is strictly higher than that under g.
Consider two nested networks g and g0 such that g ⊂ g0. Then, either g and g0 connect the same
number of delinquents but there are more direct links between them in g0 than in g,o rg0 brings
additional individuals into the pool of delinquents already connected by g, or both. Proposition
20Testing the impact of the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure on educational and criminal outcomes in the United
States, Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005, 2009) found that only 18 out of 199 networks (i.e. 9 percent) do not satisfy this
eigenvalue condition.
21Both studies use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, United States, 1994-1995.
112 shows that the density of network links and the network size (or boundaries) aﬀect positively
aggregate delinquency, a feature often referred to as the social multiplier eﬀect.22
3 Delinquency network policies
3.1 Finding the key player
The standard policy tool to reduce aggregate delinquency relies on the deterrence eﬀects of punish-
ment (see for example Becker, 1968). Formally, an increase in π, which translates into an increase
in θ, amounts to hardening punishment costs borne by delinquents. Our previous results associate
a distribution of delinquency eﬀorts across delinquents to any delinquency network connecting
them. In this case, an increase in θ aﬀects all delinquency decisions simultaneously and shifts the
whole delinquency eﬀorts distribution to the left, thus reducing the average (and the aggregate)
delinquency level.
In our model, though, delinquent behavior is tightly rooted in the network structure. When
all delinquents hold homogeneous positions in the delinquency network, they all exert a similar
delinquency eﬀort. In this case, the above-mentioned policy, that tackles average behavior and
does not discriminate among delinquents depending on their relative contribution to the aggregate
delinquency level, may be appropriate. However, if delinquents hold very heterogeneous positions
in the delinquency network, they contribute very diﬀerently to the aggregate delinquency level. The
variance of eﬀorts is higher. In this case, we could expect a sharp reduction in average delinquency
by directly removing a delinquent from the network and thus altering the whole distribution of
delinquency eﬀorts, not just shifting it. A targeted policy that discriminates among delinquents
depending on their location in the network may then be more appropriate.
The key player is the one inducing the highest aggregate delinquency reduction. Given that
delinquent removal has both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on the group outcome, the choice of
the key player results from a compromise between both eﬀects. In particular, the key player need
not necessarily be the one exerting the highest delinquency eﬀort or, equivalently, the one with
the highest centrality measure. The planner’s objective is thus to generate the highest possible
reduction in aggregate delinquency level by picking the appropriate delinquent. Formally, the
planner’s problem is the following:
max{x∗(g) − x∗(g−i) | i =1 ,...,n},
which, when the original delinquency network g is ﬁxed, is equivalent to:
min{x∗(g−i) | i =1 ,...,n} (7)
From Ballester et al. (2006), we now deﬁne a new network centrality measure d(g,θ) that will
happen to solve this compromise.
22See, for instance, Glaeser et al. (2003), and references therein.






accounts for the number of walks that crosses player i in the network i.
The intercentrality measure di(g,θ) of delinquent i is the sum of i’s centrality measures in g,
and i’s contribution to the centrality measure of every other delinquent j 6= i also in g. It accounts
both for one’s exposure to the rest of the group and for one’s contribution to every other exposure.
The following result establishes that intercentrality captures, in an meaningful way, the two
dimensions of the removal of a delinquent from a network, namely, the direct eﬀect on delinquency
and the indirect eﬀect on others’ delinquency involvement.
Proposition 3 Ap l a y e ri∗ is the key player that solves (7) if and only if i∗ is a delinquent with
the highest intercentrality in g, that is, di∗(g,θ) ≥ di(g,θ),f o ra l li =1 ,...,n.
Observe that the key player policy is such the planner perturbs the network by removing a
delinquent and all other delinquents are allowed to change their eﬀort after the removal but the
network is not “rewired”, i.e. individuals do not optimally change their relationships (links) with
their friends. This assumption can be justiﬁed for two reasons. First, it would be extremely diﬃcult
to solve a network formation problem every time a player is removed. Second, in the context of
a short-term policy and because friendship relationships take longer to adjust than the level of
criminal activity, it is reasonable to assume that delinquents do not change their friends when one
of them is removed even though they can modify their crime activity.






































































© © © ©
Figure 1
We distinguish three diﬀerent types of equivalent actors in this network, which are the following:
Type Players
1 1
2 2, 6, 7 and 11
3 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10
13From a macro-structural perspective, type−1 and type−3 delinquents are identical: they all have
four direct links, while type −2 delinquents have ﬁve direct links each. From a micro-structural
perspective, though, delinquent 1 plays a critical role by bridging together two closed-knit (fully
intraconnected) communities of ﬁve delinquents each. By removing delinquent 1, the network is
maximally disrupted as these two communities become totally disconnected, while by removing any
of the type−2 delinquents, the resulting network has the lowest aggregate number of network links.
We identify the key player in this network of delinquents. If the choice of the key player
were solely governed by the direct eﬀect of delinquent removal on aggregate delinquency, type−2
delinquents would be the natural candidates. Indeed, these are the ones with the highest number
of direct connections. But the choice of the key player needs also to take into account the indirect
eﬀect on aggregate delinquency reduction induced by the network restructuring that follows the
removal of one delinquent from the original network. Because of his communities’ bridging role,
delinquent 1 is also a possible candidate for the preferred policy target.
Table 1 computes, for delinquents of types 1, 2 and 3, the value of delinquency eﬀorts xi,
centrality measures bi(g,θ) and intercentrality measures di(g,θ) for diﬀerent values of θ and with
δ = φ =1 . In each column, a variable with a star identiﬁes the highest value.23
θ 0.1 0.2
Player Type xi bi di xi bi di
1 0.077 1.75 2.92 0.072 8.33 41.67∗
2 0.082∗ 1.88∗ 3.28∗ 0.079∗ 9.17∗ 40.33
3 0.075 1.72 2.79 0.067 7.78 32.67
F i r s tn o t et h a tt y p e −2 delinquents always display the highest b−centrality measure. These
delinquents have the highest number of direct connections. Besides, they are directly connected
to the bridge delinquent 1, which gives them access to a very wide and diversiﬁed span of indirect
connections. Altogether, they are the most b−central delinquents.
For low values of θ, the direct eﬀect on delinquency reduction prevails, and type−2 delinquents
are the key players −those with highest intercentrality measure di.W h e nθ is higher, though, the
most active delinquents are not anymore the key players. Now, indirect eﬀects matter a lot, and
eliminating delinquent 1 has the highest joint direct and indirect eﬀect on aggregate delinquency
reduction.
When the punishment cost θ is low, delinquents transfer their know-how only at a very local
level, with their direct delinquent mates. When θ increases, delinquents counter the higher deter-
rence they face by spreading their know-how further away in the network and establishing synergies
with delinquents located in distant parts of the social setting. In this latter case, the optimal tar-






14geted policy is the one that maximally disrupts the delinquency network, thus harming the most
its know-how transferring ability.
Note that the network g−1 has twenty diﬀerent links, while g−2 has nineteen links. In fact, when
θ is small enough, the key player problem minimizes the number of remaining links in a network,
which explains why type−2 delinquents are the key player when θ =0 .1 in this example.
The individual Nash equilibrium eﬀorts of the delinquency-network game are proportional to
the equilibrium Katz-Bonacich centrality network measures, while the key player is the delinquent
with the highest intercentrality measure. As the previous example illustrates, these two measures
need not to coincide. This is not surprising, as both measures diﬀer substantially in their foun-
dation. Whereas the equilibrium-Katz-Bonacich centrality index derives from strategic individual
considerations, the intercentrality measure solves the planner’s optimality collective concerns. In
particular, the equilibrium Katz-Bonacich centrality measure fails to internalize all the network
payoﬀ externalities delinquents exert on each other, while the intercentrality measure internalizes
them all. More formally, the measure d(g,θ) goes beyond the measure b(g,θ) by keeping track of
all the cross-contributions that arise between its coordinates b1(g,θ),...,bn(g,θ).
Deﬁnition 2 speciﬁes a clear relationship between d(g,θ) and b(g,θ). Holding bi(g,θ) ﬁxed,
the intercentrality di(g,θ) of player i decreases with the proportion mii(g,θ)/bi(g,θ) of i’s Katz-
Bonacich centrality due to self-loops, and increases with the fraction of i’s centrality amenable to
out-walks.
3.2 Comparing policies
The cost of ﬁnding the key player Given a delinquency network g and a punishment cost
θ, the ranking of delinquents according to their individual intercentrality measure di(g,θ)sp r o v i d e s
a criterion for the selection of an optimal target in the network. Implementing such a network-based
policy has obviously its costs. Indeed, the computation of the intercentrality measures relies on
the knowledge of the adjacency matrix of the delinquency network. This matrix is obtained from
sociometric data that identiﬁes the network links between delinquents. It is important to note that
sociometric data on delinquency is available in many cases. For instance, Haynie (2001) and Calvó-
Armengol et al. (2005) use friendship data to identify delinquent peer networks for adolescents
in 134 schools in the U.S. that participated in an in-school survey in the 1990’s. Sarnecki (2001)
provides a comprehensive study of co-oﬀending relations and corresponding network structure for
football hooligans and right-wing extremists in Stockholm. Baker and Faulkner (1993) reconstruct
the structure of conspiracy networks for three well-known cases of collusion in the heavy electrical
equipment industry in the U.S. In all these cases, one may directly use the available data to compute
the intercentrality measures.
In some other cases, though, ad hoc information gathering programs have to be implemented.
Interestingly, Costebander and Valente (2003) show that centrality measures based on connectivity
15(rather than betweenness), such as b and d, are robust to mispeciﬁcations in sociometric data, and
thus open the door to estimations of centrality measures with incomplete samples of network data.
This, obviously, reduces the cost of identifying the key player. The idea behind these results is
that these measures take into account all walks in the network. Thus, generally the centrality of
a player is not determined only by his direct links but by the complete structure of the network.
In this sense, the probability that a missing link aﬀects the choice of the most central/intercentral
player is smaller than with other type of measures. This diﬀerence turns signiﬁcant the higher the
value of the density parameter θ since, in that case, higher order walks are also taken into account
in computing the centrality/intercentrality of a player.
Key player versus random target To fully assess the relevance of the key player delin-
quency policy, we also need to evaluate the relative returns from following this network targeted
policy. For this purpose, we compare the reduction in aggregate delinquency following the elim-
ination of the key player with respect to the expected consequences when the target is selected
randomly.




j=1 [x∗(g) − x∗(g−j)]
.
This is the ratio of returns (in delinquency reduction) when i is the selected target versus a random
selection with uniform probability for all delinquents in the network.
Denote by d(g,θ) the average of the intercentrality measures in network g,a n db yσd(g,θ)
the standard deviation of the distribution of this intercentrality measures. The following result
establishes a lower bound on the ratio of returns in delinquency reduction when the key player is
removed.





The relative gains from targeting the key player instead of operating a selection at random in
the delinquency network increase with the variability in intercentrality measures across delinquents
as captured by σd(g,θ). In other words, the key player prescription is particularly well-suited for
networks that display stark location asymmetries across nodes. In these cases, it is more likely
than the relative gains from implementing such a policy compensate for its relative costs.
Key player versus standard deterrence policy Consider the key player removal policy.
When a delinquent is removed from the network, the intercentrality measures of all the delinquents
that remain active are reduced, that is, dj(g−i∗,θ) ≤ dj(g,θ), for all j 6= i∗,w h i c ht r i g g e r sa
16decrease in delinquency involvement for all of them. Moreover, when delinquent i∗ is removed from
the delinquency network, the corresponding ratio of aggregate delinquency reduction with respect
to the network centrality reduction is an increasing function of the intercentrality measure di(g,θ)








In words, the target policy displays amplifying eﬀects, and the gains following the judicious choice
of the key player (the one with highest intercentrality measure) go beyond the diﬀerences in inter-
centrality measures between this player and any other delinquent in the network.
Consider standard deterrence (“uniform”) policies that consist in increases in θ. In particular,
consider policies increasing π (i.e. increase in the ﬁne f), or reducing δ,o ri n c r e a s i n gφ.
Observe ﬁr s tt h a ta ni n c r e a s eo fπ above 1 would induce an equilibrium with no delinquency.
The problem is that the condition
πφ
δ ρ(g) < 1 in Proposition 1 that guarantees the existence of a
unique interior Nash equilibrium and that the Bonacich centrality measure is well-deﬁned may not
be anymore satisﬁed. Moreover, we are interested in situations where it is costly for the authorities
to increase π (or to implement any other policy). A thorough analysis of how the costs of diﬀerent
policies aﬀect the choice of the “right” policy is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Let us now focus on the eﬀect of π, δ,o rφ on x∗ = 1T.x∗, the equilibrium aggregate delinquency
activity. Observe that we are dealing with the situation of a unique equilibrium under Proposition
1. From expression (6), it is easy to obtain:
x∗ =
(1 − π)b(g,θ)
δ [1 + b(g,θ)]
(9)
It is then straightforward to show that the aggregate delinquency activity x∗ is increasing in the
local complementarity parameter φ but is decreasing in the global substitutability parameter δ.

























The impact on punishment results from the combination of two eﬀects that work in opposite
directions. First, the individual probability to be apprehended, and thus the punishment costs
borne by each delinquent, increase with π.T h i si sadirect negative eﬀect. Second, when π increases,
delinquents react strategically by acquiring a better delinquency technology to thwart the higher
deterrence they now face. The improvement in delinquency technology stems from more intense
17know-how inﬂows and transfers in the delinquency network. Each delinquent centrality measure
bi(g,θ) increases, which translates into a higher delinquency involvement for each delinquent. This
is an indirect positive eﬀect on aggregate delinquency that mitigates the direct negative eﬀect. In
order to better understand this last eﬀect, we run numerical simulations for δ =0 .1 and for which
the maximum value of π is consistent with the spectral condition of Proposition 1. The results are







































Figure 2a. Impact of deterrence π on total level of delinquent activity for δ =0 .1 and φ =0 .8.
We observe how the actual density of the network φ determines the sign of this eﬀect. In Figure
2a, the network is more connected (φ =0 .8) and there are a lot of synergies between delinquents.
Bonacich centralities have high values, meaning that both direct and direct links matter very
much. In that case, increasing punishment π increases total delinquent activity because the indirect
positive eﬀect dominates the direct negative eﬀect. In Figure 2b, interactions are not important
between criminals since φ =0 .1. This means in particular, that friends of friends have not that
much inﬂuence on delinquents. As a result, the network eﬀect becomes unimportant compared to
the deterrence eﬀect and an increase in punishment π reduces total delinquency x∗.T h e s er e s u l t s
imply that the policy maker should be aware of the degree of connectivity of the network if it is to
implement a deterrence policy aiming at reducing delinquent activity. In particular, if a network
of delinquents is dense and well connected so that φ is high, it should be clear that a key-player

































Figure 2b. Impact of deterrence π on total level of delinquent activity for δ =0 .1 and φ =0 .1.
3.3 From the key player to the key group
So far, we have characterized optimal single player removal from the network to reduce delinquency,
a key player. We now characterize optimal group removal from the network, a key group.
3.3.1 Finding the key group of players
In our model, individual equilibrium behavior is tightly rooted in the network structure through
(6). The removal of a set of players from the population, holding the pattern of social interactions
among the other players ﬁxed, alters the whole distribution of outcomes.
We will devote this section to identifying the optimal target set in the population when the
planner wishes to reduce aggregate delinquency.24
We wish to eliminate a group of s players from the current population. If we remove a set S
of players such that |S| = s, the network of delinquents becomes g−S. The problem is therefore
to minimize x∗(g−S) by picking the adequate set S from the population. Formally, the planner
24Bollobás and Riordan (2003) contains a mathematical analysis of the relative network disruption eﬀects of a
topological attack versus random failures in large networks. See also Albert et al. (2000) for a numerical analysis for
t h ec a s eo ft h eW o r l dW i d eW e b .








This is a ﬁnite optimization problem, which admits at least one solution. Let S∗ be a solution
to (10). We call the set S∗ a key group of the game. Removing S∗ from the game has the highest
overall impact on delinquency.
In the following, we assume that the condition on eigenvalue in Proposition 1 holds in the game,
guaranteeing the uniqueness of Katz-Bonacich solutions in any game induced by a subset of players.
The reason is that, by Lemma 3 in Appendix A, ρ(g) ≥ ρ(g−S). As a consequence, if b(g,θ) is
well-deﬁned and non-negative (as implied by the condition in Proposition 1), so is b(g−S,θ).
Deﬁnition 3 The group intercentrality of S in the network g is:
dS(g,θ)=b(g,θ) − b(g−S,θ)
In fact, dS(g,θ) is the weighted number of walks in g crossing some agent in S.T h ec a s es =1
obviously corresponds to the case of ﬁnding the key player in the delinquency network.
As with the key player, it turns out that diminishing the aggregate delinquent activity reduces
to choose the set with the highest group intercentrality:
max
|S|=s
dS(g,θ),( 1 1 )
that is, the solution25 of (7) is S∗ ⊆ N such that dS∗(g,θ) ≥ dS(g,θ), for all S ⊆ N with |S| = s.
Remark 1 An equivalent formulation of the key group problem (11) is:
max
{i1,...,is}⊆N
di1(g,θ)+di2(g−{i1},θ)+di3(g−{i1,i2},θ)+... + dis(g−{i1,...,is−1},θ), (12)
where i1,...,i s are diﬀerent two by two.
In words, the key group maximizes the sum of the individual intercentrality measures of its
members across the networks obtained through sequential removal of these members.26 The idea
behind this expression is as follows. We must eliminate a set of players S = {i1,...,i s} in order to
minimize the total number of weighted walks in the network, b(g−S,θ). After deleting player i1,t h e
25Note that we restrict the maximization program to |S| = s,g i v e nt h a tdS (g,θ) is obviously increasing in the size
of S.
26Note that this sum is independent of the order in which nodes are removed.
20resulting number of walks is b(g,θ) − di1(g,θ). Now, the expression di2(g−i1,θ) counts the number
of walks that hit agent i2 once agent i1 has been eliminated, so that we are not counting the same
walk twice. Thus, b(g,θ) − di1(g,θ) − di2(g−i1,θ) is the remaining set of walks after eliminating
players i1 and i2, keeping in mind that we only want to count each walk once. By the previous
argument, also note that the remaining set of weighted walks is the same if we change the order of
deletion of these two players, that is:
b(g,θ) − di1(g,θ) − di2(g−i1,θ)=b(g,θ) − di2(g,θ) − di1(g−i2,θ)
Extending this argument to the rest of the players in S,w eo b t a i ne x p r e s s i o n( 1 2 ) .
3.3.2 Example
Consider again the network g in Figure 1 with eleven delinquents and a decay factor θ =0 .2.W h e n
s =1 , note that Katz-Bonacich centrality and our individual intercentrality measure are diﬀerent
concepts. The ﬁrst accounts for the inﬂuence of one agent from his position, in terms of the number
of agents that he can reach. The second adds the contribution of this agent to the Katz-Bonacich
centrality of the others. Hence, individual intercentrality captures the role of each agent as a broker
in the interactions among the others. For instance, it is easy to check that the key player is 1
because he has the highest individual intercentrality d1(g,θ)=4 1 .67. But the player with the
highest contribution need not be the one with highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. In particular,
individual 2 is more (Katz-Bonacich) central than individual 1: b2(g,θ)=9 .17 > 8.33 = b1(g,θ).
Consider the case where the required group size is s =2 . The next table shows the values of
group intercentrality dS(g,θ) for each possible subset S of size 2 when θ =0 .2.F o r t h e s a k e o f
simplicity, subsets that yield the same network architecture when they are removed are considered
as equivalent:








The key group is {2,7}, that is, a set of two maximally connected nodes (with ﬁve direct contacts
each), both connected to the intercentral player 1, and each at a diﬀerent side of this player. This






21Suppose that we were to approximate the solution to this optimization problem with a greedy heuris-
tic procedure that sequentially picks up the player that maximizes the individual intercentrality at
each step. Formally, let
i∗
1 =a r gm a x
i∈N
di(g,θ)
and then, at each step 2 ≤ t ≤ s, choose the player i∗
t with maximum intercentrality in the network












breaking possible ties arbitrarily. This greedy algorithm ﬁrst eliminates player 1, and then any other
remaining player (after player 1 has been removed, all the other players have identical positions in
the network). Thus, the algorithm returns a group which is not optimal: there are other groups that
are better candidates than {1,2}. Indeed, in this example, player 1 is not only very intercentral,
but also his intercentrality is very much correlated with the intercentrality of others. Hence, being
greedy and eliminating it at the ﬁrst stage reduces the chance of ﬁnding highly central players at
further stages. And, in fact, player 1 is not part of the key group!
Nevertheless, we have obtained a relatively accurate approximation for the result by a simple
greedy algorithm, instead of choosing among all possible pairs of agents. Note that, in this example,




In fact, when s =2 , this error can be at most 25%. In the next section devoted to algorithmic
considerations, we discuss this issue more generally.
3.3.3 Algorithmic considerations
We prove that the key group problem has an inherent complexity that suggests the use of approx-
imation algorithms. In particular, we will study the performance of a greedy procedure where the
optimal group is constructed by iteratively choosing an optimal vertex from the network. For a
description of NP−hard problems and properties, see Garey and Johnson (1978) and Ballester
(2004).
Now, we show that the key group problem is NP-hard, even when we want to completely disrupt
the game. First, note that if we were to implement a “brute-force” basic algorithm to ﬁnd a key




groups of players and compute each
particular contribution to the game. This combinatorial procedure may involve up to an exponential
number of steps in n. The computational complexity here is mainly combinatorial, that is, while
computing the contribution of a given group to the activity of the game is computationally tractable,
the fact that this task has to be done an exponential number of times (in the worst case) makes the
22problem potentially intractable. NP−hardness relates to the diﬃculty of computationally solving
a particular class of problems. Hence, by showing that the key group problem is NP-hard, we show
that there is no possible sophisticated algorithm such that, given any network, will return the exact
key group in reasonable time.27 This means that the key group problem is a NP-hard problem, from
the combinatorial perspective. Nevertheless, we will show below that we can eﬃciently approximate
it.
Proposition 5 The problem of ﬁnding a key group in a network g is NP-hard.
Since the computational complexity inherent to the key group selection is high, it is suitable to
use algorithmic approximations in order to solve real-life problems with large networks.
Consider a greedy algorithm that sequentially eliminates in s stages the player with highest






such that for all t =1 ,...,s,p l a y e riG
t is the most






.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t :
Proposition 6 The key group problem can be approximated in polynomial-time by the use of a
greedy algorithm, where, at each step t, expression (8) is used to ﬁnd the agent iG
t who will become
a member of the approximated key group SG. The error of the approximation can be bounded as
follows.
ε ≡






This proposition shows that the error of approximation of using a greedy algorithm instead of
solving directly the key group problem is at most 36.79%.28 If the approximation error is over
30 percent in most situations then it would be diﬃcult to claim that this result provides a good
approximation. Let us now provide some numerical simulations where the bound is calculated for
a (large) number of diﬀerent situations and show that the actual value of the approximation error
is in fact rather small. For that, let us consider diﬀerent scenarios of random networks based on
the following variables:
(i) Number of players. We consider two cases: n =1 0and n =1 5 .F o rl a r g e rn, combinatorial
problems become very important.
(ii) Probability p of a link between any pair of players (i.e. criminals) in the random network. We
consider three cases: p =0 .3 (sparse networks), p =0 .5 (moderate networks) and p =0 .75
(dense networks).
27This fact is conjectured by nearly all computer scientists who believe that there is no such algorithm for solving
any NP−hard problem. A simple reason for this is that, after decades of continuous search, no one has found an
eﬃcient algorithm for solving any NP−hard problem.
28As Nemhauser et al. (1978) have showed, the error bound obtained is tight. See Appendix A and, in particular,
Proposition 10, for deﬁnitions and technical details..
23(iii) Decay factor θ. We consider two cases: networks with small decay factor where long walks
matter very little (θ is equal to 10 percent of its upper bound, i.e. θ =0 .1/ρ(g),w h e r eρ(g)
is the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix G) and networks with high decay factor where
long walks matter almost as much as short walks (θ is equal to 90 percent of its upper bound,
i.e. θ =0 .9/ρ(g)).
(iv) Size of the key group k. We consider four cases for n =1 0(i.e. k =2 ,3,5,8) and four cases
for n =1 5(i.e. k =3 ,5,8,12).
This means that, in total, we have 2 × 3 × 2 × 4=4 8possible scenarios since there are 2
possible n,3p o s s i b l ep, 2 possible θ and 4 possible k. In each scenario, we perform a simulation
with 100 possible diﬀerent networks. For each simulation, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the exact key group by
searching through all possible subsets of players (for instance, for n =1 5and k =8 , the program




= 6435 subsets of 8 players) and obtains its intercentrality
dS∗ (g,θ); second, we approximate the optimal group using the greedy algorithm and obtains its
intercentralitydSG (g,θ); ﬁnally, we calculate the relative error of approximation
dS∗(g,θ)−dSG(g,θ)
dS∗(g,θ) ,
which should be below 36 percent according to Proposition 6. The following two tables display the
results of our numerical simulations for n =1 0and for n =1 5 . The numbers in the tables are the
average relative error of approximation (in percentage) over the 100 networks in each scenario.
k =2 k =3 k =5 k =8
p =0 .3 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.05 0.06 0.12 0
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.24 0.15 0.13 0
p =0 .5 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.12 0.08 0.09 0
p =0 .75 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02
Case 1: n =1 0
k =3 k =5 k =8 k =1 2
p =0 .3 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.08 0.02 0.11 0
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.11 1.7 0.10 0
p =0 .5 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.01
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.02
p =0 .75 θ =0 .1/ρ(g) 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02
θ =0 .9/ρ(g) 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.03
Case 2: n =1 5
24In all cases displayed in the tables, the relative error of approximation is very small, varying
between 0 percent (when k =8for n =1 0or k =1 2for n =1 5 ) and 1.7 percent (for k =5and
n =1 5 ). Note that these simulations have been performed for random networks, which tend to
be more “symmetric” that networks that are not random. For example, for the bridge network
described in Figure 1, the error of approximation was 16 percent. Still, this value is relatively low
compared to the upper bound of 36.79 percent. Therefore, we are pretty conﬁdent that the use of
the greedy procedure can be guaranteed to provide a fairly good approximation SG for the true
solution S∗ of the problem.
3.4 Finding the key link
L e tu sn o wf o c u so nad i ﬀerent crime policy that targets links rather than individuals.T h ea i mo f
this policy is to choose how to remove optimally a link (or a set of links) between two individuals in
order to minimize the total delinquency level. In some situations, the limitation of resources or the
nature of the problem requires to optimally choose among the set of dependences among players.
For instance, a social planner would like to optimally reduce the (communication) externalities
among delinquents subject to a restriction in the number r of bilateral inﬂuences that can be
targeted. This situation can be interpreted as a problem of optimally removing a set of links from
the network.
L e tu si l l u s t r a t et h i sp o l i c yw i t hr e a l - w o r l de xamples. As stated above, a link removal means
a disruption of the communication between two delinquents. For instance, when a policeman is
watching the street, he is somehow disrupting the possible communication between delinquents
from the same neighborhood (a link can be understood as communication in a particular place).
This policeman is not, however, avoiding communication with other delinquents somewhere else.
Another example is to put a delinquent teenager in another school where there are less delinquent.29
By doing so, this delinquent will stop his activities and communication with other delinquents in
the older school. In this section, we will not compare link-removal and player-removal policies since
it depends on the costs for the policy maker, and we are not dealing with this issue. The key-link
policy should, however, be understood as closely related to the key-player policy since the removal
of a player implies the removal of his links plus the removal of the isolated player that remains.
Removing a set of links is somewhat more ﬂexible because the policy-maker can target links from
diﬀerent players.
More formally, for g0 ⊂ g,l e tlg0(g,θ) be the number of walks in g (weighted by θ)t h a tu s e
some edge in g0. This is the contribution of g0 to the total connectivity of g.
Suppose that we need to maximize the change in network activity after removing at most r
29See, for example, Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005) who study the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
experiment that relocates families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods. They ﬁnd that this policy reduces
juvenile arrests by 30 to 50 percent of the arrest rate for control groups.
25links. Our best choice will consist of r links from the set of all possible links not present in g.




Consider again the bridge network described in Figure 1. As in the case of the key player, even
when r =1 , the optimal choice can depend on the strength of complementarities, as shown in the
following table:





For moderate values of θ (i.e. θ =0 .1), the key link to be removed is the one between the most
central nodes, i.e. delinquents 2 and 6. However, for higher values of θ (i.e. θ =0 .22), intermediate
positions become more relevant and the key link is part of the bridge between the two clusters in
the network, i.e. delinquents 1 and 2.
Let us now derive more general results. We ﬁrst deal with the case of directed links (non-
symmetric networks) since it provides an easier expression of our result. In this case, the planner
has more degrees of freedom because it can target speciﬁc directed links. Let h ≡ g\{ij} be the
network g where gij is set to zero. The following relation holds in this class of networks, for all pair
of agents k,l ∈ N:
mkl(g,θ) − mkl(h,θ)=θmki(h,θ)mjl(g,θ) (13)
That is, all walks from k to l arrive at i for the ﬁr s tt i m eb e f o r ec r o s s i n gij (so this set of walks
occurs in the network h), cross the link ij a n dt h e nc o n t i n u ef r o mj to l in the network g.L e t





Let e bi(g,θ) be the Katz-Bonacich in-centrality of player i, i.e., the weighted sum of the value





Lemma 1 The contribution of a single directed link ij ∈ g to the total Katz-Bonacich centrality of





26This expression reﬂects the asymmetry of players i and j under the assumption of directed
links. The eﬀect of a directed link ij depends roughly on the in-centrality of player i and the
out-centrality of player j.
When links are undirected, the following expression allows us to compute the contribution of
a single link ij ∈ g to the total Katz-Bonacich centrality of the network g. The proof is omitted,
being similar to the case of directed links.
Lemma 2 The contribution of a single undirected link ij ∈ g to the total Katz-Bonacich centrality












In order to provide an interpretation, we take a moderate θ. Then, lij(g,θ) is proportional to
bi(g,θ)bj(g,θ). This means that, for moderate values of θ, the key link is the one connecting any
two nodes with highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. This was the case in the example above where
the link {2,6} was chosen when θ =0 .1.
Expressions (14) and (15) have obvious advantages, as (8) does in the case of the key player.
We can compute the contribution of any link ij from the current data M(g,θ) without having
to recompute an inverse M(g\{ij},θ) for each ij ∈ g. These operations are clearly cheaper than
the computation of an inverse. This fact becomes critical if we are to approximate the optimal
interaction set. The reason is that the function lg0(g,θ) is submodular30 in g0 so that we can
iteratively ﬁnd the maximum of lij(g,θ) using (14) or (15) to obtain quickly a good approximation
of the problem:
Proposition 7 The key interaction set problem can be approximated in polynomial-time by the use
of a greedy algorithm where, at each step, expression (14) or (15) is used to ﬁnd the link ij (with
highest lij(g,θ)) that will become a member of the approximated key interaction set. The error of
the approximation can be bounded as follows:
ε ≡






4 Joining delinquency networks
4.1 Equilibrium networks
In this section, we extend our game in order to allow individuals to choose whether they want
to participate in the crime market or not in the ﬁrst stage. So far, we have assumed that the
30See Deﬁnition 7 in Appendix A for the deﬁnition of a submodular function.
27delinquency network was given. In some cases, though, delinquents may have opportunities outside
the delinquency network. For instance, petty delinquents may consider entering the labor market
and giving up delinquent activities. Here, we expand the model and endogenize the delinquency
network by allowing delinquents to take a binary decision on whether to stay in the delinquency
network or to drop out of it.31 Formally, we consider the following two-stage game.
Fix an initial network g connecting agents.
In the ﬁrst stage, each agent i =1 ,...,n decides to enter the labor market or to become a
delinquent. This is a simple binary decision. These decisions are simultaneous. Let ci ∈ {0,1}
denote i’s decision, where ci =1(resp. ci =0 ) stands for becoming a delinquent (resp. entering the
labor market), and denote by c =( c1,...,c n) the corresponding population binary decision proﬁle.
We assume that agents entering the labor market earn a ﬁxed wage (nonnegative scalar) ω>0.
The payoﬀ for delinquents is determined in the second stage of the game.
In the second stage, delinquents decide their eﬀort level, which depends on the ﬁrst-stage out-
come.
Deﬁnition 4 The extended game is a two stage game where:
• In stage 1, each player i ∈ N decides whether to participate (ci =1 )o rn o t( ci =0 )t ot h e
crime market.
• In stage 2, let S be the set of players who decided to participate. Then, these players play the
game in gS.
• The ﬁnal utilities are:
Ui(S,xS,g)=
(
ui(xS,g S) if i ∈ S
ω otherwise
We study the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of this extended game.
Deﬁnition 5 The set S is supported in equilibrium if there exists a ω and a subgame perfect
equilibrium where the set of players who decide to participate is S, given the outside option ω. S
is also called an (equilibrium) participation pool of the game at the wage level ω.
Let E(ω) be the family of sets supported by ω at equilibrium in the extended game.
The following result characterizes the class of sets that can be supported by some ω.
31See Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) for a similar endogenous game of network formation in the context of
the labor market, where the binary decision for agents is to enter the labor market network or to drop out.
28Proposition 8 Let S ⊆ N and θρ(g) < 1 for all j ∈ N\S.T h e n , t h e s e t S is supported at



















all agents outside the delinquency pool is an equilibrium, that is, ∅ is supported as an equilibrium
by ω.
Whenever an equilibrium exists, multiplicity of equilibria is a natural outcome of the extensive
form game. This multiplicity can arise, for instance, from the symmetric role of some agents in a
network.32
4.2 Participation game without global substitutability
Suppose that δ is small, that is, we have that the second-stage game is close to a game with strategic
complementarities. Let S be a participation pool (not necessarily an equilibrium pool) at some






that is, it is proportional to its centrality in the network gS∪{i}.
Given that the outside option ω is ﬁxed, it is clear that the two-stage game is supermodular,33
in the sense that the payoﬀso fp l a y e ri are increasing with respect to participation decisions of
other agents. Formally, for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and i ∈ N\T, it is clear that:
bi(gS∪{i},θ) ≤ bi(gT∪{i},θ)
because the right-hand side measures a higher number of walks.
This property ensures the existence of equilibrium for any wage ω,a ss u m m a r i z e db yt h e
following proposition.
32Two agents i and j are symmetric in a network whenever the network remains with the same structure after
exchanging their labels. In this case, if S is supported at equilibrium, i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S,s oi sS
0 where i has been
interchanged with j.
33A game is supermodular if, for every player i
• his action set Si is compact,
• his utility ui (si,s −i) is upper semi-continous in si,s −i.
• his utility has increasing diﬀerences in (si,s −i).
For a broad description of supermodular games and their applications, see Amir (2005), Topkis (1998) and Vives
(2005).
29Proposition 9 When δ is small, the extended game has at least one equilibrium participation pool.
One may be interested in providing all the possible equilibria of the game when supermod-
ularity holds. Echenique (2007) provides a useful tool to list all the equilibria of a game with
complementarities.
The intuitive idea here is that substitutability is low enough to allow for increasing diﬀerences
in utility of agents in their decisions to enter the participation pool.
4.3 Finding the key player with criminal participation decision
Given that this game usually displays multiple subgame perfect equilibria in the endogenous delin-
quency network game, we deﬁne x∗(g,ω) to be the maximum aggregate equilibrium delinquency
level when the delinquency network is g and the labor market wage is ω. This delinquency level is
equal to the total amount of delinquency in the worst case scenario of maximum delinquency.
Consider some binary decision proﬁle c.L e ti be an active delinquent, that is ci =1 . Suppose
that delinquent i switches his current decision to ci =0 , that is, delinquent i drops out from the
delinquency pool and enters the labor market instead. The binary decision proﬁle then becomes
c − νi, and the new set of active delinquents is C(c − νi)=C(c)\{i}. The drop out of delinquent
i from the delinquency pool also alters the network structure connecting active delinquents, as
any existing direct link between i and any other delinquent in C(c) is removed. The new network










The key player problem acquires a diﬀerent shape in the setting with endogenous formation of
delinquency pools. Initially, the planner must choose a player to remove from the network. Then,
players play the two-stage delinquency game. First, they decide whether to enter the delinquency
pool or not. Second, delinquents choose how much eﬀort to exert. In this context, there is an
added diﬃculty to the planner’s decision. The removal of a player from the network aﬀects the rest
of the players’ decisions to become active delinquents. This fact should be taken into account by
the planner in order to attain an equilibrium with minimum total delinquency. The right choice
of the key player should be based upon the remaining delinquency pool that will result from that
decision, that is, what the remaining players will decide concerning their delinquent activities.
We show, with the help of an example, that there is no trivial geometric recipe for the key
player problem in this case.
Consider again the network in Figure 1 with eleven players. Recall that, when θ =0 .2 and
the network of delinquents is exogenously ﬁxed (or, equivalently, the outside option is ω =0 ), the
key player was the player acting as a bridge, i.e. delinquent 1. If we now consider the endogenous
delinquency network formation in the two-stage game, the results may diﬀer. Indeed, for low wages,
30player 1 is also the key player and the resulting equilibrium network is the whole remaining network,
that is, ten delinquents remain and are split into two fully connected cliques of ﬁve delinquents.
However, when ω becomes higher, delinquent 2 becomes the key player34 and the equilibrium
network now encompasses six diﬀerent players. It consists of a clique of ﬁve fully intraconnected
players together with player 1.
These results are summarized in the following table, which gives, for two diﬀerent values of ω,
the key player, the highest aggregate delinquency that results from eliminating this key player, and
the equilibrium delinquency network.
ω =0 .001 ω =0 .003
x∗(g−1,ω) 0.7843 0.7843
x∗(g−2,ω) 0.7847 0.7785
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Intuitively, when outside opportunities are high enough, all players from the same side of the
player being removed do not have enough incentives to enter the delinquency pool at the ﬁrst stage
of the game. Hence, we do not get a “large” equilibrium with many players, and this constitutes
an advantage for the planner who will choose to delete node 2. This example implicitly explains
how one policy (providing a higher ω) increases the eﬀectiveness of another policy (choosing the
key player) in order to reduce delinquency. These policies are complementary from the point of
view of their eﬀects on total delinquency, although we are aware that they may be substitute if we
had considered a budget-restricted planner who had to implement costly policies.
4.4 The key-group problem with criminal participation decision
In the simple case without outside option, the choice of the key group was based on the contribution
of that group to the connectivity (total Katz-Bonacich centrality) of the network. In the context
of games with criminal participation decision, an additional criterion should be taken into account:
the fact that a removal of some players may induce further voluntary moves of other players in the
network. Thus, the choice of the optimal target can change accordingly, and diﬀer from the usual
key group prescription when all players participate. We analyze the interplay between the optimal
target and an outside option that acts as a participation threshold in the new game.
The issue of existence will be relaxed in this section by assuming that we are dealing with a
wage ω such that, for any subgame in the subnetwork gT,w i t hT ⊆ N, there exists an equilibrium
participation pool S supported by ω. On the other hand, multiplicity of equilibria makes it diﬃcult
to adopt a particular approach in order to assess the eﬃcacy of a particular policy. In this paper, we
34In fact, any player except player 1 is the key player for ω =0 .003.
31focus on a extreme approach where the removal of a set of players from the network is evaluated by
comparing the maximum equilibrium of the original game and the resulting game, that is, outcomes
with maximum total activity x∗.
Deﬁnition 6 Given an extended game with wage ω and T ⊆ N, the remaining family after elimi-
nating S is deﬁned as:
P(ω,S)={T ⊆ N\S, T ∈ E(ω)}
In words, a set T ⊆ N\S is in the remaining family after eliminating S whenever T is a
participating pool in the restricted extended game played in g−S.T h i sd e ﬁnition is just capturing
the the posterior behavior of players after S’s removal.
For a candidate set S to be eliminated, let Pm(ω,S) ∈ argmaxT∈P(,ω,S){b(gT,θ)} be a maximum
equilibrium participation pool when the set S is eliminated. It is a pool where the maximum activity
is achieved. Then, the choice of a key group S∗ of size s is:
S∗ ∈ arg min
|S|≤s
b(gPm(ω,S),θ)
Let us illustrate this with the network described in Figure 1. We study the problem of elim-
inating one player (s =1 )w h e nθ =0 .2. When we analyze the extended game with criminal
participation decision, it is crucial for the planner to consider the possible transitions between dif-
ferent pools of delinquents. In particular, there are now three eﬀects that should be taken into
account when choosing the set of players to be removed:
(i) A direct eﬀect due to the reduction of their initial delinquent activity. The choice is here
biased towards the most Katz-Bonacich central players.
(ii) An indirect eﬀect due to the (lower) incentives of the remaining players. In this dimension,
group-intercentrality is the relevant variable to consider.
(iii) Ap o s s i b l esnow-ball eﬀect because the removal of a player may induce a process where the
remaining players (sequentially) ﬁnd it proﬁtable to leave the pool of delinquents and to
participate to the labor market. This eﬀect depends on the magnitude of the outside option
ω.
The next table summarizes the sets S that are sustainable in equilibrium for the games played
in g−1 (i.e. when delinquent 1 is removed) and g−2 (i.e. when delinquent 2 is removed), specifying
the range [ωL,ωH] of wages that support for each S an equilibrium participating pool (we can have
32multiplicity of equilibria). We just specify distinct (up to network isomorphism) equilibrium pools:
g−1 g−2
Pool S ωL ωH b(gS,θ) ωL ωH b(gS,θ)
{2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11} 0.00 12.50 50.00 − − −
{2,3,4,5,6} 0.50 12.50 25.00 − − −
{1,6,7,8,9,10,11} − − − 1.02 1.70 39.47
{1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11} − − − 0.00 4.17 51.33
{1,7,8,9,10,11} − − − 1.70 7.03 36.25
{7,8,9,10,11} − − − 7.03 12.50 25.00
{1,3,4,5,6} − − − 0.95 1.25 12.37
{3,4,5,6} − − − 1.25 3.12 10.00
To illustrate the results given in this table, let us consider the case when ω =5 .I f d e l i n -
quent 1 is removed then the highest equilibrium pool consists of all delinquents but 1, that is
N\{1} = {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}. This is exactly the same choice as in the case without criminal
participation decision, which is based on the intercentrality index. If, on the contrary, delinquent 2
is removed then for the wage ω =5 , it is easily seen that the maximum equilibrium pool becomes
{1,7,8,9,10,11}. In other words, with the exception of 1, all the delinquents directly connected to
2 ﬁnd it not proﬁtable to become delinquents and instead prefer to participate to the labor market.
As a result, when the wage is ω =5and there is no criminal participation decision, then the key
player is delinquent 2 because its deletion from the network has the highest impact on the incentives
of other players to become delinquent. In other words, by deleting delinquent 2 instead of 1, fewer
individuals will become delinquent. This will also lead to a higher decrease in the aggregate level
of crime.
If we now consider a much lower wage, say ω =0 .4, then removing delinquent 1 or 2 will
h a v et h es a m ee ﬀect on individuals’ participation in criminal activities. Indeed, in both cases, all
individuals will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to be delinquent since when 1 is removed, {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}
will be criminals in equilibrium while, when 2 is removed, the equilibrium pool of delinquents
is: {1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}. This suggests that the eﬀectiveness of a key-player policy should not
only be measured by the direct and indirect eﬀects on delinquent activities but also by the group
interactions it engenders in terms of participation to the labor market.
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37Appendix A. Notation and deﬁnitions.
A.1. Matrix and vector notations
Matrices and vectors w i l lb ed e n o t e di nb o l dl e t t e r s ,l i k eA and x, respectively. If not explicitly
stated, all matrices are square. The entries of A (matrix) and x (vector) are written as aij and xi,
respectively.
The transpose of A and x are AT and xT.T h e m a t r i x Ak is the k-th power of A,a n di t s
(i,j)-entry is written a
[k]
ij .
T h ei d e n t i t ym a t r i xi sI.T h es y m b o l0 will be used for the zero vector. The symbol 1 will be
used for the one vector, where every entry is 1. Given a vector x,t h es c a l a rx ≡ 1T · x is the sum
of all its entries, and xS ≡ 1T · xS,w h e r exS is the restriction of the vector x to the indices in S.
An eigenvalue of a matrix A is a complex number μ satisfying A · v = μv for some complex
vector v.L e tS(A) (called the spectrum of the matrix A)b et h es e to fa l le i g e n v a l u e so fA.
A.2. Networks
A network (graph) g consists of a set of agents (vertices or nodes) N and a set of weighted
links (edges) between them, where gij ≥ 0 is the weight assigned to the link ij.W em a yr e p r e s e n t
a network by means of a nonnegative square adjacency matrix G =( gij)i,j∈N. Without loss
of generality, we will consider networks where gij ∈ [0,1].A n e t w o r k gij is un-weighted when
gij ∈ {0,1}, for all i,j ∈ N.
The network g is symmetric (or undirected) when its adjacency matrix G is symmetric,t h a t
is, gij = gji for all i,j ∈ N.
We refer to the agents i and j as being directly linked in the network g, whenever gij > 0.
Al i n kij is incident with the vertex v ∈ N in the network g whenever i = v or j = v.
A walk in g of length k from i to j is a sequence p = hi0,i 1,...,i ki of agents such that i0 = i,
ik = j, ip 6= ip+1,a n dip and ip+1 are directly linked, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ k −1.A g e n t si and j are said
to be indirectly linked in g if there exists a walk from i to j in g. An agent i ∈ N is isolated in g if
gij =0for all j. The network g is said to be empty when all its agents are isolated.
We say that a walk p crosses or hits agent i if i is in the sequence deﬁned by the walk. The
walk p covers the set S ⊆ N if p crosses every agent i ∈ S.
We say that network g0 is a (proper) subnetwork of g, written g0 ⊆ g (g0 ⊂ g), whenever N0 ⊆ N
and G0 ≤ GN0 (G0 ¯ GN0).
Given a network g and a set S ⊆ N,w es a yt h a tgS is the subnetwork of g induced by S
whenever the adjacency matrix of gS is GS.W ew r i t eg−S to denote the network gN\S,t h a ti sg−S
is the network that results after eliminating all the agents in S.
38The spectral radius of a network g is deﬁned as:
ρ(g)= m a x
μ∈S(G)
|μ|
where |μ| is the modulus of the (complex) eigenvalue μ of the matrix G.W h e ng is undirected, all
the eigenvalues of G are real and ρ(g) is called the index of the network g.
We adapt some results from spectral graph theory35 and algebra into our framework.
Lemma 3 The following properties hold for any network g:
1. If g0 ⊆ g,t h e nρ(g0) ≤ ρ(g).
2. ρ(gS) ≤ ρ(g) for all S ⊆ N.
A.3. Maximization of submodular functions
The optimal choice of the group of players requires, at least potentially, the study of all possible
combinations of subsets of N. Thus, a computational approach is required. Let z :2 N → R be a
set function. Consider the problem of solving (7), that is,
max
S⊆N
{z(S):|S| ≤ s}. (16)
Deﬁnition 7 The set function z :2 N → R is submodular (supermodular) if for all S,T ⊆ N,
z(S)+z(T) ≥
(≤)
z(S ∪ T)+z(S ∩ T)
Without loss of generality we can normalize z such that z(∅)=0 . We only consider nonde-
creasing functions:
z(S) ≤ z(T) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N
although the following results can be adapted to non-monotonic functions. Let us denote individual
contributions by:
ρz
i(S)=z(S ∪ {i}) − z(S)
In fact, the set function z is submodular if individual contributions are increasing with respect to
set containment.







35Cvetkovi´ c et al. (1997) is the main reference for spectral graph theory.
39The problem of maximizing a submodular function, or equivalently, minimizing a supermodular
function, is NP-hard, in general. Nemhauser et al. (1978) propose a polynomial-time greedy
heuristic for approximating this kind of problem. At each step, the algorithm augments the solution
set with the agent with the highest contribution:
Let S0 = ∅.A ts t e pt set St = St−1 ∪ it,w h e r eit ∈ argmaxi∈N\St−1 ρz
i(St−1). Stop whenever
ρz
it(St−1) ≤ 0 or |St| = s.
We summarize part of their results in the following proposition. Let Z b et h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo f
(16) and ZG be the value obtained by applying the greedy algorithm.
The following results allow us to construct the proof of Proposition 6.
Proposition 10 If the greedy heuristic is applied to the problem (16), where z is submodular, then













Lemma 4 The function dS(g,θ) is submodular in S.
Proof. Take S ⊆ T ⊆ N.L e tb
[k]
ji (g) denote the number of k-walks starting at j and crossing i





− (b(g,θ) − b(g−S,θ))



















= dT∪{i}(g,θ) − dT(g,θ).
40Appendix B. Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .We would like to apply Theorem 1 of Ballester et al. (2006). First,
observe that the utility function ui(x1,...,x n) in Ballester et al. (2006), deﬁned by their equation



































Second, our utility function ui(x,g) deﬁned by (3) is equivalent to the utility function ui(x1,...,x n)




(β + γ)=δ,γ = δ,λ = πφ
which is equivalent to
α =1− π,β = γ = δ,λ = πφ
Now since by (4), σij ∈ {σ,σ}, for all i 6= j with σ ≤ 0, then we can use Corollary 1 in Ballester et al.
(2006), and the condition on eigenvalue: β>λ
√
g + n − 1 can now be written as: πφ
√
g + n − 1 <
δ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . It suﬃces to apply Theorem 2 of Ballester et al. (2006) to our
framework.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . It suﬃces to apply Theorem 3 of Ballester et al. (2006) to our
framework.










, for all i =1 ,...,n.
By deﬁnition, di∗(g,θ) ≥ di(g,θ), for all i =1 ,...,n. This implies that:
1+b(g,θ) − di∗(g,θ)
1+b(g,θ) − dj(g,θ)
≤ 1, for all j =1 ,...,n,
and, thus ηi∗(g,θ) ≥ di∗(g,θ)/d(g,θ).N o t i n gt h a tdi∗(g,θ) ≥ d(g,θ)+σd(g,θ), we can conclude.
41P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
A vertex cover of a network g is a subset of vertices S ⊆ V (g) such that every link ij ∈ g is
incident with some vertex in S.A minimum vertex cover is vertex cover of minimum size. Note
that in any minimum vertex cover, any removal of a vertex from the set will make it fail to cover all
the links. The problem of ﬁnding a minimum vertex cover in a network is known to be NP-hard
(Karp, 1972). We show that we can solve this diﬃcult problem by transforming it, in at most
n-steps, into a key-group problem, concluding that ﬁnding a key-group is also hard.
Lemma 5 The set S∗ is a vertex cover of g if and only if S∗is a key group of size |S∗| that disrupts
the network g in the game.
Proof. Let S∗ be a vertex cover of g. Obviously, if we are asked to remove |S∗| players in order
to minimize activity, the set S∗ would be a solution (a key group) that leaves all nodes isolated in
the network. Conversely, if S∗ is a key group that leaves all nodes isolated, then it must be because
it is a vertex cover (all links are incident to nodes in S∗).
T h i sm e a n st h a ti fw ew a n tt oﬁnd a minimum vertex cover of a network, we have to iteratively
ﬁnd the key groups of sizes 1,2,... until the network is completely disrupted at some stage k ≤ n
(the number of iterations is at most n). In this stage k,w eh a v ef o u n dt h ek e yg r o u pS∗
k,w h i c hi s
a minimum vertex cover.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .The result is a direct consequence of Proposition 10 and Lemma 4
in Appendix A.










for all k,l ∈ N.
Summing over all k and l, the result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .The conditions θρ(g) < 1 implies that bj(gS∪{j},θ) is well-deﬁned for
all S ⊂ N and j ∈ N\S. Given that ρ(gS∪{j}) ≥ ρ(gS), bi(gS,θ) is all also well-deﬁned for all i ∈ S.
On the other hand, by Proposition 1, this also implies the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in




δ (1 + b(gS,θ))







¢bi(gS∪{j},θ) for all i ∈ S (20)
42Now, uniqueness in the second-stage allows us to concentrate on the pure strategy Nash equi-
libria of the whole game where no agent j outside a sustainable S would be willing to enter the




; and no agent i ∈ S would be better oﬀ
by obtaining ω, rather that ui (x∗(gS),g S).F o r m a l l y ,as e tS is supported by ω at equilibrium if







≤ ω ≤ min
i∈S
ui (x∗(gS),g S).
The result follows by using (19) and (20), and applying simple algebra to compute the utilities.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . We provide an instance of participation pool, by construction.








This means that, at each step, players that want to enter the pool do so. Stop whenever there is no
such agent it. It is clear that St (probably empty) is an equilibrium pool. The main implication of
supermodularity is that this sequential decisions cannot be rolled-back: if an agent decided to enter
the pool, then it must be proﬁtable for him to stay after more agents have decided to participate.
43